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STUDENT SYMPOSIUM ON OIL & GAS
CONSIDERATION OF MINERAL RIGHTS IN
EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS
In an eminent domain proceeding, the owner of a mineral interest
may have his or her rights affected by the outcome of the litigation.'
For example, where a large tract of land is acquired by the expropriator,
the mineral owner may find the exercise of his right to explore and
produce minerals impossible or more expensive due to the use of the
surface by the expropriator. In such a case, the owner of the mineral
interest has suffered a loss in order to facilitate the project which is
the subject of the expropriation. The determination of who should bear
this loss will depend on the balancing of the need for public improve-
ments and the protection of property rights. Ideally, the balance which
should be obtained is one which will adequately compensate the loss
which the mineral owner has suffered without deterring needed im-
provements.
This article will (1) begin by focusing on the provisions of the
Louisiana Constitution of 1974 which provide for compensation to the
full extent of loss whenever property is taken or damaged for public
purposes; 2 (2) explore the nature of the interest which is acquired
Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. The terms "mineral owner" or "owner of a mineral interest" will be used
throughout this paper to indicate the person in whom sub-surface rights are vested. Since
the Mineral Code adopts the servitude theory rather than a theory based on ownership
of minerals in place, this terminology can lead to some confusion. Thus, in the case
where the landowner has not burdened the minerals beneath his tract, the terms "mineral
owner" and "owner of a mineral interest" will refer to the landowner. Where the
landowner has burdened his estate these terms will refer to the person in whose favor
these charges against the estate have been established.
2. La. Const. art. I, § 4 provides:
Every person has the right to acquire, own, control, use, enjoy, protect, and
dispose of private property. This right is subject to reasonable statutory re-
strictions and the reasonable exercise of the police power.
Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its political subdivisions
except for public purposes and with just compensation paid to the owner or
into court for his benefit. Property shall not be taken or damaged by any
private entity authorized by law to expropriate, except for a public and necessary
purpose and with just compensation paid to the owner; in such proceedings,
whether the purpose is public and necessary shall be a judicial question. In
every expropriation, a party has the right to trial by jury to determine com-
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by the expropriator; (3) examine the policy of protection of property
rights which was reaffirmed in the new constitution and which justifies
limiting the interest acquired by the expropriator; and (4) address the
issue of the valuation of mineral rights where they have either been
taken or damaged by the expropriating authority.
3
Implications of the Constitutional Provisions
Prior to the enactment of article 1, section 4 of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974, 4 Louisiana courts employed a categorical approach
when confronted with the issue of just compensation in an eminent
domain proceeding. That is, the "category of harm resulting in damage
generally appears to have been dispositive of the issue of compensa-
bility.'" Thus, even if the landowner was able to demonstrate actual
economic injury, his claim would fail "if the category of the injurious
activity or category of harm ha[d] not been established as compensable." 6
Under this approach, mineral rights have been recognized as a com-
pensable category both in theory7 and in the jurisprudence.8 The courts
nonetheless remained wary of the mineral rights category since valuation
of a mineral right involves considerable speculation.
The right to receive compensation in expropriation cases is consti-
tutionally protected by the taking clause of the United States Constitution9
which is made applicable to the states through the operation of the Due
pensation, and the owner shall be compensated to the full extent of his loss.
No business enterprise or any of its assets shall be taken for the purpose of
operating that enterprise or halting competition with a government enterprise.
However, a municipality may expropriate a utility within its jurisdiction. Personal
effects, other than contraband, shall never be taken.
This Section shall not apply to appropriation of property necessary for levee
and levee drainage purposes.
3. For a discussion of the issue of the valuation of rights associated with underground
storage formations, see Comment, Underground Gas Storage: Opposing Rights and Interests,
46 La. L. Rev. 871 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Underground Gas Storage]. See also
Mississippi River Transmission Corp. v. Tabor, 757 F.2d 662 (1985); Southern National Gas
Co. v. Poland, 406 So. 2d 657 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981); Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Sutton,
406 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981); Mid-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Sanchez, 280 So. 2d 406
.(La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
4. See supra note 2.
5. M. Dakin & M. Klein, Eminent Domain in Louisiana 62 (1970).
6. Id.
7. Comment, Expropriation-Compensable Items in Louisiana, 24 La. L. Rev. 849,
871-72 (1964).
8. State v. Woodard, 189 So. 2d 601 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966); State v. Miller, 189
So. 2d 603 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966); State v. Miller, 184 So. 2d 780 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1966).
9. U. S. Const. amend. V provides, in part, "nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation."
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Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 0 The taking clause pro-
hibits the taking of private property for public purposes without "just
compensation." This provision has been limited by the "res" concept"
which limits compensation to the value of that which is actually acquired
by the expropriating authority.'2 Such a limited construction could be
detrimental to the owner. For example, damage to the landowner's
remaining property would go uncompensated under this construction as
the damaged property was not taken by the expropriator.
In an expropriation, there are essentially three situations in which minerals
are either taken or damaged. In the first situation, ownership of the tract
of land is granted to the expropriator. Because the Mineral Code provides
that the "landowner has the exclusive right to explore and develop '"'3
the oil and gas occurring beneath the surface, such minerals are effec-
tively taken by the expropriator. In the second situation, the ownership
of the tract of land is granted to the expropriator, but the mineral
rights are reserved to the landowner. 4 Both parties may consent to such
a reservation if the landowner is convinced that his mineral interest is
worth more than the expropriator is willing to pay and, accordingly,
the expropriator would prefer the landowner keep his "overpriced"
mineral interest. In the third situation, the expropriator is granted only
a servitude over the land and, therefore, the mineral rights are unaf-
fected. In both the second and third situations the "res" concept would
preclude recovery as the minerals are not "taken" by the expropriator.
However, the holder of such a mineral interest may incur a pecuniary
loss in that the taking of the surface may make access to the minerals
impossible, economically infeasible, or more difficult and expensive.
Both the 1921's and the 197416 Louisiana Constitutions provide relief
for the mineral owner in such a case by providing for compensation
10. Chicago Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 17 S. Ct. 581
(1897).
II. See Note, Expropriation: Compensating the Landowner to the Full Extent of His
Loss, 40 La. L. Rev. 817 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Expropriation.].
12. The United States Supreme Court stated that "the compensation must be a full
and perfect equivalent for the property taken. And the just compensation, it will be
noticed, is for the property, and not to the owner." (emphasis added). Monogahela
Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326, 13 S. Ct. 622, 626 (1893).
13. Min. Code art. 6.
14. In this situation, the minerals are treated as subject to a perpetual servitude.
State v. Salter, 184 So. 2d 783 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966) (citing Hodges v. Long-Bell
Petro. Co. 240 La. 198, 121 So. 2d 831 (1960).
15. La. Const. art. 1, § 2 (1921): "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, except by due process of law. Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution,
private property shall not be taken or damaged except for public purposes and after just
and adequate compensation is paid."
16. See supra note 2.
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whenever property is taken or damaged for public purposes. Thus, the
Louisiana rule allows compensation for property remaining after the
taking so long as it has been "damaged."' 7 Certainly, the holder of a
mineral interest that decreases in value as a result of an expropriation
of surface rights has a valid claim of "damage."
Although the "taken or damaged" language was retained from the
prior law, the level of compensation was increased from a standard of
"just and adequate compensation" to a new standard of compensation
"to the full extent of [the owner's] loss."' 8 Such an expansive standard
was included based primarily on the belief that landowners had been
inadequately compensated in prior eminent domain proceedings 9 and
that the power of expropriation had been abused by both public and
private expropriators.20
This constitutional provision not only affects the level of compen-
sation to be awarded in an expropriation proceeding, but also expands
the categories which are compensable. 2' It has been persuasively argued
22
that categories once found to be noncompensable, such as consequential
and incidental damages,2 3 should now receive judicial recognition under
the "full extent of his loss" standard. 24 Likewise, damage to mineral
rights should more readily receive judicial recognition and more sufficient
compensation. In fact, such a categorical approach seems unsound under
the new standard in that any category of loss should be compensable
"upon adequate proof of such losses." '25 To rule otherwise would be
to render the "full extent" language meaningless.
In addition to the increased protection of property rights under this
new standard, expropriation is "a general expression of the deep-rooted
conviction that the purpose of government is to promote and protect
the general welfare of society at large." ' 26 Thus, the courts will tend to
examine the interrelation of these two policies when confronted with an
17. See M. Dakin & M. Klein, supra note 5, at 61-62; Comment, Expropriation-
A Survey of Louisiana Law, 18 La. L. Rev. 509, 551-55 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Survey].
18. Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35
La. L. Rev. I, 15, (1974).
19. Id. Jury trials were also given a constitutional guarantee in the hopes of en-
couraging more substantial awards. See Jenkins, The Declaration of Rights, 21 Loy. L.
Rev. 9, 23 (1975).
20. Jenkins, supra note 19, at 20.
21. See supra text accompanying note 4.
22. See supra note 11.
23. M. Dakin & M. Klein, supra note 5, at 68.
24. See Note, Expropriation, supra note 1 I, at 827.
25. See infra text accompanying note 50. State v. Constant, 359 So. 2d 666, 672
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
26. M. Dakin & M. Klein, supra note 5, at 19.
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expropriation case. Presumably, greater compensation will deter needed
improvements. The 1974 Constitution places primary emphasis on the
protection of property rights and has been construed to mean that the
"landowner cannot be required to suffer pecuniarily in order to en-
courage public improvements. '2 7 This reading is consistent with prior
court decisions which had found that statutes authorizing expropriation
are "special and exceptional in character, in derogation of common
right" and, therefore, must be strictly construed.2"
Nature of the Interest Acquired
The nature of the interest acquired by an expropriator in an eminent
domain proceeding has been the subject of far less litigation than the
issue of compensability.2 9 This difference is probably due to the owner's
primary concern with adequate compensation and his or her unwillingness
to litigate an issue which has seldom been resolved favorably. However,
landowners may be encouraged to litigate this issue in the future since
the "full extent of his loss" language arguably includes attorney's fees3°
and statutory provisions allow for the recovery of an expropriatee's
attorney's fees under certain circumstances. 3 Moreover, the landowner
will want to protect his property rights by attempting to limit the nature
of the interest which is acquired by the expropriating authority.
In order to maintain a successful eminent domain proceeding, the
expropriator must show that the proposed project is for a necessary
and public purpose.12 The public purpose requirement is essentially a
judicial determination that the proposed project will benefit the public."
27. See Note, Expropriation, supra note 11, at 827; Dakin, Work of Appellate Courts
1977-78, 39 La. L. Rev. 793, 794-95, and cases cited therein.
28. Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Nicholson, 460 So. 2d 615, 621 (La. App. ist Cir.
1984) citing Orleans-Kenner Electric Ry. v. Metairie Ridge Nursery Co., 136 La. 968, 68
So. 93 (1915).
29. M. Dakin & M. Klein, supra note 5, at 33-57.
30. Hargrave, supra note 18, at 15.
31. La. R.S. 19:8 (1979) provides in part:
Immediately after compensation has been determined, the plaintiff shall, upon
motion of the defendant, present evidence as to the highest amount it offered
the defendant for the property prior to trial on the merits. After hearing evidence
on the issue, the court shall determine the highest amount offered. If the highest
amount offered is less than the compensation awarded, the court may award
reasonable attorney fees. ...
32. See Comment, Survey, supra note 17, at 513. The requirements for maintaining
a successful eminent domain proceeding involve a showing of: (i) the purpose of the
taking, (2) the necessity of the taking, (3) the authority of the taker, (4) the procedure
employed and the extent of compliance therewith, (5) the previous payment of fair
compensation, and (6) the attempt to avoid litigation by a prior tender of value. Id. at
512.
33. M. Dakin & M. Klein, supra note 5, at 18-19, 356-370.
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The public purpose requirement is distinguished from the necessity re-
quirement which deals with "the location of the expropriation, the extent
of the estate to be acquired thereby both qualitatively and quantitatively,
as well as the wisdom" of the proposed project. 34 Thus, it is the necessity
requirement that is the focus in an examination of the nature of the
interest acquired.
The general rule is that "the amount of land and the nature of the
interest taken must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the proposed project." As with the new constitutional provisions, this
rule seeks to protect the landowner's property interest to the fullest
extent possible without overly deterring needed improvements. Thus,
where a servitude will be sufficient to satisfy the needs of the expro-
priator, it will be granted rather than full ownership despite the perpetual
nature of the use.
36
A review of the jurisprudence, however, reveals that ownership is
awarded in many circumstances where the needs of the taker would
have been adequately served by a mere servitude. At least three reasons
can be suggested to explain this tendency. First, the issue of necessity
must be raised by the landowner. Otherwise, the court will grant the
nature of the interest requested by the expropriator." Second, the dis-
cretion of the expropriating authority has usually been upheld and is
limited only by a test of bad faith or gross abuse of discretion.3 1 Third,
the courts may be attempting to keep property rights from being per-
manently fragmented as would be the case in many of the servitudes
granted in eminent domain proceedings. This last policy alone, however,
has not prevented courts from limiting the nature of the interest acquired
to a mere servitude despite some apparently permanent uses.
In Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Nicholson,39 a railroad sought
to expropriate over 300 acres of the defendant's 2500 acre plantation
for the construction of a modern railroad classification yard.' Uncon-
34. Id, at 28.
35. Id. at 366.
36. John T. Moore Planting Co. v. Morgan's Louisiana & T.R. & S.S. Co., 126
La. 840, 53 So. 22 (1908).
37. M. Dakin & M. Klein, supra note 5, at 38.
38. Id. at 34-35.
39. 460 So. 2d 615 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
40. A railroad classification yard was described by the court as:
a modern, electronic or computerized, gravity classification yard, in which freight
trains are received in a long receiving yard; and by moving individual cars over
a hump in the yard, they are rolled by gravity, and directed by switching onto
tracks designated for certain destinations. The purpose of such a classification
yard is to aggregate railroad cars in blocks going to common destinations.
Functionally, cars are pulled from the respective classification tracks in the
proper order and assembled into trains in the departure yard. Locomotives and
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tradicted evidence was admitted which showed that exclusive use of the
entire 300 acre surface would be required to conduct the desired clas-
sification activities. The court correctly resolved the issue of the nature
of the interest acquired by holding that the railroad was "only entitled
to expropriate an exclusive personal servitude of use." '4' The trial court
had erroneously granted the railroad full ownership since "the defendants
(Nicholson) ha[d] not seriously questioned the necessity for the taking
of property in fee." ' 42 The court emphasized that the railroad had "no
need of any subsurface rights." '43 Implicit in this reversal was the finding
that a challcige to the nature of the interest acquired is no longer
mandatory-at least where a private expropriator is concerned.
Concerning the necessity requirement, the new constitutional pro-
vision provides a different standard dependent on whether the expro-
priating entity is public or private. The constitution provides:
Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its
political subdivisions except for public purposes and with just
compensation paid to the owner or into court for his benefit.
Property shall not be taken or damaged by a private entity
authorized by law to expropriate, except for a public and nec-
essary purpose and with just compensation paid to the owner;
in such proceedings, whether the purpose is public and necessary
shall be a judicial question. 4
Thus, where a .private entity is given the power of expropriation, the
Constitution requires a showing of necessity. No such showing is required
where a public entity is the expropriator. Although the logic of this
distinction is unclear, 4 the end result should be a greater degree of
scrutiny as-to the nature of the interest acquired where the expropriator
is a private entity.46 It is submitted that greater scrutiny should also be
applied where the state or any of its political subdivisions is the ex-
propriator. Although such scrutiny is not mandated by the new Con-
stitution, in light of its emphasis on the protection of property rights,
such scrutiny is appropriate for preventing the expropriator from ac-
quiring more than is necessary to accomplish the proposed project. The
cabooses are connected to such trains. Then, all the necessary tests, such as
air-brake tests,. are performed; and the trains depart from that yard.
Id at 619-20.
41. ld.at-621.
42. Id. at 620.
43. '"Id. at 621 (citing John T. Moore Planting Co., 126 La. at 840, 53 So. at 22).
44. La. Const. art. 1, § 4.
45. See, Hargrave, supra note 18, at 16. The distinction was the result of a compromise




public expropriator would not be unduly burdened by a higher level of
scrutiny, nor will it risk acquiring less than is required.
The nature of the interest acquired has practical ramifications for
the valuation of minerals. Different methods of determining compens-
ability and different burdens of proof attach depending on whether the
minerals are "taken", as where full ownership is granted, or "damaged",
as where a servitude is obtained or where the minerals are reserved.47
There is no constitutional prohibition against the expropriation of own-
ership of the minerals and the Mineral Code "in no way attempts to
prevent [a public entity] from acquiring full ownership of the land and
minerals. '48 However, the absence of a prohibition should not be taken
to mean that an award of ownership of land and minerals is the
appropriate balance of the policies of encouraging public improvement
and protecting property rights."
Valuation of Minerals
As previously mentioned, 0 "the amount of compensation and dam-
ages due the landowner is usually the crucial issue in expropriation
proceedings."'" However, a hiatus in the use of jury trials52 and "simple
factual patterns" 53 have retarded the growth of evidentiary rules in this
area.14 However, it has been noticed that these rules have been "quite
practically workable and generally sufficient." 5 For example, rules gov-
erning the admissibility of opinion evidence were more liberal, based
both on the assumption that judges were better able to filter the evidence
than were juries and on the overall need for such evidence when making
property or mineral valuations. Nonetheless, as a general proposition,
the rules of evidence applicable in ordinary civil proceedings have been
found to be controlling in expropriation cases.56
Taking Analysis
Where ownership is acquired but not made subject to a mineral reser-
vation, the expropriator becomes the holder of the mineral rights. The
47. See infra text accompanying notes 50-86.
48. Day, Prescriptibility of Mineral Rights in Public Lands: Articles 149-151 of the
New Mineral Code, 1977 Min. L. Inst. 61, 63.
49. See supra text accompanying note 14.
50. See supra text accompanying note 29.
51. M. Dakin & M. Klein, supra note 5, at 354.
52. Jury trials were not used from 1948 to 1974. See Hargrave supra note 18, at 14
n. 58.
53. See Comment, Survey, supra note 17, at 557.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. M. Dakin & M. Klein, supra note 5, at 354-55.
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ordinary test for "just compensation" in a "taking" case is the fair
market value of that which is taken. 7 Fair market value is generally
defined as the price "a buyer, willing but not obligated to buy, would
pay a seller, willing but not obligated to sell that subject property.""8
Since the expropriator is acquiring the land as containing the minerals,
those minerals cannot be valued separately and added to the value of
the land. Where valuable oil and gas are concerned, the speculative
nature of the value of these minerals makes such a mutually agreed
upon price difficult to obtain. Thus, the reservation of such minerals
becomes a more attractive solution in this situation.
Where less valuable solid minerals are concerned, the "unit rule '" '59
functions to limit compensation to the fair market value of that which
is taken. For example, if the land contained "X" quantity of minerals
which have a market value of "Y per unit," the product X Y cannot
simply be added to the value of the land so as to obtain a figure in
excess of the value of the land in a normal real estate transaction.
The traditional statement of the unit rule is that "condemned land
containing minerals is to be valued as including the minerals, the value
of which cannot be shown separately."w6 This rule has been harshly
criticized since a willing buyer would at least want to be informed of
the mineral content of the land, whereas this rule holds such evidence
inadmissible. 61
The more liberal, modified unit rule allows the parties to admit
evidence of the separate value of minerals in the subject property pro-
vided certain criteria are fulfilled:
(1) The existence and quantity of the minerals can be accurately
determined (technological advances have gone far in the
elimination of guesswork in this area);0
(2) The expenses of production and marketing are taken into
consideration in valuing the minerals;
(3) This element of value is clearly significant;
57. M. Dakin & M. Klein, supra note 5, at 30.
58. Id. at 30-31. See, e.g. State v. Hayward, 243 La. 1036, 150 So. 2d 6 (1963).
59. The unit rule has been the subject of a considerable amount of comment. The
following works are examples: J. D. Eaton, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation 37-42
(1982); H. Kaltenbach, Master Guide to the Successful Handling of Condemnation Val-
uation 1603-17 (1972); E. Rams, Valuation for Eminent Domain 280-82 (1973); S. Searles,
Eminent Domain, 23-31 (1982). Bickley, Current Trends and New Decisions in Eminent
Domain, Institute on Eminent Domain 213, 218-224 (1967); Bickley, Compensable and
Non-Compensable Damages, Institute on Eminent Domain 31, 32-39 (1960); Note, Eminent
Domain: Approaches to Valuation of Real Estate with Emphasis on Mineral Properties,
74 W. Va. La. Rev. 307 (1971-1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, Eminent Domain].
60. 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 174 (1965).
61. Note, Eminent Domain, supra note 59.
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(4) The exploitation of the minerals is not inconsistent with
the highest and best use of the land; and most importantly
(5) The jury should be instructed that the evidence of separate
value is only a factor to be considered in determining the
total value of the land itself.
62
Since these criteria are more in accord with the factors a normal buyer
or seller would consider in.valuing the land, it appears that the modified
version of the unit rule more accurately reflects fair market value and
more adequately compensates the landowner.
Where a taking analysis is appropriate, Louisiana courts have fol-
lowed the more liberal unit rule which allows evidence of the value of
minerals underlying the surface, provided adequate jury instructions are
given to prevent jurors from simply adding the mineral value rather
than considering mineral value as merely an element of the land's value.
63
In State Department of Highways v. Hart, " this evidence was held
admissible, but the case was tried before a judge. To hold such evidence
inadmissible under the "full extent of his loss" standard would greatly
impair the landowner's ability to prove the full extent of his loss. In
addition, carefully drafted jury instructions should prevent excessive
awards, thereby furthering the policy of encouraging public improvement.
As in most civil litigation, the allocation of the burden of proof is
often determinative of the outcome of litigation.65 Interestingly, when
applying a taking analysis, "neither party to [an expropriation pro-
ceeding] must bear the burden of proving the fair market value of the
property taken." ' Thus, where a taking of minerals is concerned, it is
a misnomer to speak of a failure to carry the burden of proof. Each
party will attempt to introduce evidence as to the effect that the minerals
have upon the value of the land with the trier of fact resolving the
issue.
Damage Analysis
Unlike the taking analysis, the burden of proof is clearly on the
owner, as the party claiming damages, to show the extent of damage
to his mineral interest. The applicable test requires the owner to prove
both the value of his mineral rights before the taking of the surface
and the value of his mineral rights after the taking of the surface. His
62. S. Searles, supra note 59, at 23-24.
63. Note, Eminent Domain, supra note 59, at 322..
64. 249 So. 2d 310 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1971).
65. M. Dakin & M. Klein, supra note 5, at 355.
66. Id. at 373.
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damages are the difference between these two values. This is commonly
known as the "before and after test."
67
A damage analysis is applicable where a servitude is granted-thereby
leaving the minerals in the same hands as before the expropriation. This
approach should also be used where ownership is granted subject to a
reservation of a mineral interest. Although the Mineral Code prohibits
separate ownership of minerals from the land until those minerals are
reduced to possession,68 such an analysis applies because the mineral
owner has the exclusive right to exploit such minerals during the term
of his interest. 69 Significantly, where the federal government or the state
is the expropriator, such a mineral interest becomes imprescriptable.
70
This rule protects the holder as his interest will not prescribe for failure
to exercise that interest during the ten year prescriptive period. If title
is later transferred to a non-public entity, prescription of nonuse is
treated as suspended while ownership was vested in the government. 7'
67. Id. at 70-78.
68. Min. Code art. 5: Ownership of land includes all minerals occurring naturally
in a solid state. Solid minerals are insusceptible of ownership apart from the land until
reduced to possession."
Min. Code art. 6 provides:
Ownership of land does not include ownership of oil, gas, and other minerals
occurring naturally in liquid or gaseous form, or of any elements or compounds
in solution, emulsion, or association with such minerals. The landowner has the
exclusive right to explore and develop his property for the production of such
minerals and to reduce them to possession and ownership.
69. Hodges v. Long-Bell Petro. Co., 240 La. 198, 121 So. 2d 831 (1960).
70. Min. Code art. 149 provides:
When land is acquired from any person by the the United States or the state
of Louisiana or any subdivision or agency of either by conventional deed or
other contract or by condemnation or expropriation proceedings and when by
the act of acquisition, order, or judgment, a mineral right otherwise subject to
the prescription of nonuse is reserved, the prescription of nonuse shall not run
against the mineral right so long as title to the land remains in the government
or any of its subdivisions or agencies, or any legal entity with expropriation
authority. If, however, the land, or any part thereof, is transferred by the
government subdivision, agency or legal entity with expropriation authority to
a private owner, the prescription of nonuse shall apply as in the usual case but
shall commence only from the date on which the act of acquisition by the
private owner is filed for registry.
71. Min. Code art. 150 provides:
When land is acquired in the manner prescribed in Article 149, the prescription
of nonuse shall contiiue to run against any then outstanding mineral rights
subject to such prescription and shall accrue in favor of the owner from whom
the land was acquired. Thereafter, the prescription of nonuse shall not run
against such rights except as provided in Article 151.
Min. Code art. 151 provides:
Article 150 is applicable only if the government, governmental subdivision,
agency or legal entity with expropriation authority remains the owner of the
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Finally the unit rule has no application when a damage analysis is
used. As one author stated, the unit rule applies
only where there has been no severance of the mineral rights
into the separate estates of the surface and mineral ownership.
Where there has been a mineral deed or a severance, the estates
should be valued separately, and all of the owners should be
made parties to the suit. Where they are separated, the extent
of the taking is going to have a lot to do with the value that
is placed upon the mineral estate. It is possible . . . that there
will be no actual taking of the mineral estate itself .... In
this situation it is possible that there may be an increased cost
in the mining, in that it may have to be directional or somewhat
limited, but still not any actual taking.7"
A review of the Louisiana cases illustrates that the landowner may
have a difficult time recovering the full extent of his loss under the
damage analysis where evidentiary problems stand in his way.
In Nicholson, the defendant claimed damage to his mineral interest
as a compensable item. Since a servitude was granted, a damage analysis
is appropriate. As previously discussed, the burden of proof, therefore,
rests on the landowner to show a difference in the value of the minerals
before and after the taking of the surface rights. The trial court had
awarded $250,000 to the defendant for damage to mineral rights. Re-
versing, the first circuit stated:
Having been granted only a servitude, the Railroad has not
taken any mineral rights. The record does not establish any
restrictions on the landowner's right to recover minerals, if any;
except possibly directional rather than straight drilling would be
required. The evidence fails to show that the value of mineral
rights, if any, would be measurably diminished by the restriction
of surface access to the landowner."
Faced with the conflicting testimony of the two parties' expert witnesses,
the court refused to award compensation. The railroad's expert testified
that there was no potential for mineral exploitation on the subject
property. The defendant's expert disagreed pointing out that the direc-
tional drilling required would increase recovery cost thereby decreasing
land at the time the mineral right is extinguished. If the land, or a part thereof,
is transferred by the government, subdivision, agency, or legal entity with
expropriation authority to a private owner, the prescription of nonuse shall
commence or resume as to the whole or the part in question from the date on
which the act of acquisition by the private owner is filed for registry and shall
accrue in his favor.
72. Bickley, supra note 59, at 219.
73. Nicholson, 460 So. 2d at 628.
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the profit realized on the minerals. Such damage was estimated at
$600,000. The court phrased its decision as a failure of the defendant
(landowner) to meet his burden of proof.
In light of the renewed emphasis on the protection of property rights
in the 1974 Constitution, as exemplified by the "full extent of his loss"
standard, the court's analysis is at least questionable. In expropriation
cases, the term "burden of proof" refers to a burden of persuading
the trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence.74 Where the trier
of fact is persuaded as to the occurrence of a loss and as to its amount,
it should not be lightly overturned upon review. The credibility of
witnesses is a much easier determination at the trial level and the weight
given to such evidence is determined accordingly. In fact, it is difficult
to determine what amount of evidence, short of an admission, would
suffice when making such a valuation.
Such an admission was involved in State v. Salter" and its companion
case.16 In Salter, eighty acres of the defendant's land were expropriated
by a state agency for use as a floodland for the Toledo Bend Dam and
Reservoir Project. As a pre-1974 case involving a public expropriator,
no issue appears to have been raised as to the necessity of the interest
acquired. However, all mineral rights were reserved to the landowner
in perpetuity and, therefore, were not "taken.t 77 The primary issue on
appeal was whether the defendant could recover damages for the reserved
mineral rights.
The defendant was able to overcome the evidentiary obstacle of
proving damage to his mineral interest by obtaining from the plaintiff
a stipulation that the court should consider the valuation evidence in-
troduced in a contemporaneous case78 pending in federal district court.
In that case, the testimony of geologists, petroleum engineers, drillers,
and operators established a mineral value of eleven dollars per acre.
Faced with this evidence, the state's own appraiser represented the value
of the minerals in Salter's land as ten dollars per acre. With the value
of the minerals thereby established, the defendant went on to show that
due to the inundation 9 of his land, extraction of the minerals was not
economically feasible. Applying the before and after method of val-
uation, and since the mineral worth was totally destroyed, the court
74. M. Dakin & M. Klein, supra note 5, at 355.
75. 184 So. 2d 783 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
76. State v. Miller, 184 So. 2d 780 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
77. Salter, 184 So. 2d at 786.
78. Id. at 787 (citing State v. Elden Dees, No. 10707 (W.D. La. 1966)).
79. Other restrictions were also in existence-namely that "the constitution (of 1921]
provides that the exploration and development of such mineral rights 'shall not endanger
or impair properties and facilities of the authority."' Salter, 184 So. 2d at 186. However,
the court placed little emphasis on this restriction.
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found defendant's minerals to be damaged to the extent of their value.8
Requiring total destruction of minerals before allowing the owner to
recover for their "damage," of course, cannot be supported under the
"full extent of his loss" standard. Nonetheless, landowners have had
difficulty in establishing lesser damages, absent a stipulation as was
present in Salter.
A final example will again show the difficulty mineral owners have
had in establishing their damages. In Cajun Electric Power Cooperative,
Inc. v. Estate of Thomas,81 a private entity sought to expropriate over
220 acres of land belonging to two defendants for the construction of
a lignite-powered electric generating plant. The court was again faced
with conflicting testimony:
The Thomas defendants offered testimony by an engineer who
had conducted tests on the Thomas property to show that there
were lignite deposits beneath that property. Plaintiff countered
with the testimony of an expert mining engineer who testified
that because of the size and depth of the deposits, mining would
be economically unfeasible and the deposits had no value.
As previously noted, the defendants offered no expert opinion
evidence as to value.82
Although it may be argued that what is not economically feasible
today may be so tomorrow, 3 it is apparent that this argument was not
before the court and, furthermore, without "evidence in the record as
to the present value of mineral rights or the effect of the taking on
such value," 84 the court was correct in denying recovery. Without this
information, the court cannot determine the value of the mineral rights
since the evidence of value before and after the taking is missing.
Cajun Electric is also significant in that it recognizes that Salter is
"authority for taking into consideration a reduction in the present value
of mineral rights caused by an interference with or prohibition against
exercise of those rights resulting from the use to which the surface will
be put."'" Thus, Cajun Electric is authority for the proposition that a
reduction in the present value of mineral rights caused by the increased
costs in extracting such minerals, should be recognized as a compensable
element of damages in cases such as Nicholson.
The difficulty which mineral holders have in establishing their losses,
and the hesitancy which courts exhibit in making awards which are
80. M. Dakin & M. Klein, supra note 5, at 149.
81. 408 So. 2d 1001 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
82. Id. at 1003.
83. Comment, Underground Gas Storage, supra note 3, at 892-93.
84. Thomas, 408 So. 2d at 1004.
85. Id.
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inherently speculative in nature, leads one to question the validity of a
test based upon the present value of the mineral rights. Mineraj rights
are seldom sold based on present value. They are normally leased to
an entity which may or may not conduct drilling operations on the
property. The mineral owner in such a situation may wish to establish
the value of comparative mineral leases in the area in order to avoid
the problems posed by such a test. In fact, the mineral holder in Salter
argued that the present market value for leasing was the appropriate
test, but due to the stipulation which was previously discussed, he was
not forced to look to comparative leases to establish that value . 6 The
speculative nature of the inquiry into the value of mineral rights makes
finding a test which will compensate the mineral owner without unduly
deterring needed improvements a difficult task.
Conclusion
The adoption of the "full extent of his loss" standard in the
Louisiana Constitution of 1974 calls for a reexamination of the necessity
requirement and the methods for valuating mineral rights. When private
entities expropriate, courts have employed a higher level of scrutiny in
reviewing the decision of the expropriator as to the nature of the interest
acquired. Such scrutiny will lead to a greater number of servitudes which
are granted in fact situations where ownership had previously been
granted. The effect of limiting the nature of the interest acquired is
that the "damage" analysis will be used more frequently where minerals
are involved. This calls for a reevaluation of the evidentiary rules which
have made recovery more difficult for the mineral holder. If a public
expropriator is involved, a greater degree of scrutiny is also suggested
although it is not mandated by the new Constitution.
In those cases where a "taking" analysis is appropriate for the
mineral interest involved, the application of the more liberal of the unit
rules, which has already been adopted in Louisiana, will more fully compensate
the mineral owner than would the more conservative approach. Addi-
tionally, jury instructions should be carefully constructed so as to not
encourage excessive awards, thus deterring needed public improvements.
Where a "damage" analysis is appropriate, the mineral owner's
attorney must be prepared to meet the burden of proving both the
present value of the minerals and the value of the mineral rights after
taking. Without proving both of these values by a preponderance of
the evidence, the court is unlikely to award compensation because such
an award would be too speculative in nature. The mineral owner may
wish to use comparative leases, if available, to help establish these values.
86. 184 So. 2d at 786.
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Where both of these elements are proved to the court's satisfaction, the
landowner mineral holder whose interest has been "damaged" by an
expropriation of surface rights should be able to recover the "full extent
of his loss" in accordance with the before and after test.
Robert A. Dunkelman
